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Extended abstract - description of preliminary results
At Harvard Business School, like at many other professional schools around the country, stu-
dents learning experience requires limits on the number of students in a class. This creates an
interesting allocation problem for school administrations: students need a seat in several classes,
and classes have limited capacity. In addressing this problem, all schools have some e¢ ciency and
fairness objectives in mind.
In practice, this is a very hard problem. There is no known allocation mechanism that is ex-post
e¢ cient, strategyproof and minimally fair (in a way make more precise in the paper). The dening
features of a course allocation problem are that students require more than one course and that
there are no monetary transfers. In this paper, we identify precisely the nature of the incentive
problem in two classes of course allocation mechanisms that contain all known mechanisms used
in practice: draft mechanisms (draft mechanisms assign courses to students according to a random
order over students) and point bidding mechanisms (where studentsbids determine their priority
for a course). In both classes of mechanisms (and except for dictatorships), students have an
incentive to "overreport" their preferences for popular courses and this incentive does not vanish
"when the market grows large." In other words, preference manipulation (and ex-post ine¢ ciency)
can be seen as unavoidable in the course allocation problem and it is useful to understand what
drives preference manipulation and how it a¤ects outcomes. To do so we study a specic mechanism,
the one used at Harvard Business School to allocate second year classes. We argue that students
in the HBS mechanism will tend to overrate popular courses and underrate unpopular courses, and
that this will result in increased congestion. We conrm these predictions in data for the academic
year 2005-06. Moreover, we show that strategic behavior in the HBS mechanism hurts students
overall. This result suggests that they might be a trade-o¤ between the HBS mechanism that is
"fair" but ine¢ cient and random serial dictatorship that is unfair but e¢ cient. Based on our data
we simulate the outcome from random serial dictatorship. The results indicate that, despite the
negative e¤ect of strategic behavior in the HBS mechanism, the HBS mechanism is still preferable
to RSD on a number of measures.
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